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Engaging excellence? Effects of faculty quality on 
university engagement with industry 
 
Abstract   
We investigate how universities’ research quality shapes their engagement with 
industry. Previous research has predominantly found a positive relationship between 
academics’ research quality and their commercialization activities. Here we use 
industry involvement measures that are broader than commercialization and indicate 
actual collaboration, i.e. collaborative research, contract research and consulting. We 
hypothesize that the relationship between faculty quality and industry engagement 
differs across disciplines, depending on complementarities between industrial and 
academic work, and resource requirements. Using a dataset covering all UK 
universities, we find that in technology-oriented disciplines, departmental faculty 
quality is positively related to industry involvement. In the medical and biological 
sciences we find a positive effect of departmental faculty quality but establish that this 
does not apply to star scientists. In the social sciences, we find some support for a 
negative relationship between faculty quality and particularly the more applied forms 
of industry involvement. The implication for science policy makers and university 
managers is that differential approaches to promoting university-industry relationships 
are required.   
 
 
Keywords: University-industry relations; faculty quality; collaborative research; 
contract research; academic consulting; technology transfer; academic 
entrepreneurship; commercialization. 
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1. Introduction  
Recent policy has encouraged universities to play an active role in the 
commercialization of academic knowledge (Siegel et al., 2007; Bercovitz and 
Feldman, 2006), which has raised questions about the compatibility of the 
‘disinterested’ pursuit of science (Merton, 1973), and engagement with industry. 
Important to this enquiry is how faculty quality relates to industry involvement. Are 
the universities with the most successful researchers also the ones who work most 
with industry? Or are the more ‘applied’ universities more successful at establishing 
relationships with industry despite their academic standing being lower? These 
questions are of great relevance for policy-makers who attempt to balance the quality 
of scientific production with the diffusion of university-generated technologies within 
the wider economy.  
The evidence on these issues is mixed. Attitudinal studies suggest that academics at 
highly rated research universities tend to be wary of excessive commercial 
involvement for fear it will undermine their academic productivity and independence 
(Lee, 1996; Glaser and Bero, 2005). Industry involvement may require specific skills 
and organizational capabilities that are different from those required to excel in the 
academic arena (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). At the same time, a number of studies 
suggest that faculty quality is positively related to engagement in patenting and 
academic entrepreneurship (Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Siegel et al., 2007). In other 
words, faculty who patent more and act more entrepreneurially are also more prolific 
academic contributors.  
Patenting and academic entrepreneurship, however, are imperfect measures of the 
knowledge transfer and co-creation occurring during university-industry interactions. 
Relational forms of involvement, such as collaborative research, contract research, 
and consulting, are more widespread and seen as more relevant by firms (D'Este and 
Patel, 2007; Cohen et al., 2002). The insights from patenting and academic 
entrepreneurship, therefore, cannot easily be generalized. Actual relational 
involvement with industry may demand more faculty time and dedication than 
patenting, which may be a by-product of the research. Furthermore, collaboration 
differs from academic entrepreneurship in that it tends to be informed by research-
related rationales, rather than an explicit desire to appropriate the financial returns on 
academic knowledge (D'Este and Perkmann, 2010). This means collaboration may be 
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more strongly driven by complementarities, achieved by working with industrial 
partners and pursuing academic research, rather than a single-minded focus on 
commercial success (Owen-Smith, 2003).  
In this paper, we explore how the quality of university faculty is related to their 
industry engagement via collaborative research, contract research and academic 
consulting. We contend that university-industry relationships are the outcome of a 
voluntary matching process (Becker, 1973) between academic and industry partners, 
shaped by three forces. First, academics’ decisions to work with industry are informed 
by considerations of complementarity with academic research. Second, resource 
considerations play a role as academics can use the funding gained from industry 
contracts to supplement grants from public sources. Third, firms are interested in 
working with high-quality academic researchers because, in addition to seeking 
project-specific inputs, they are attracted by more generic benefits such as accessing 
students, ‘windows’ on emerging technologies, and enhancing their knowledge bases. 
Relational involvement between universities and industry can be seen, therefore, as a 
matching process in which partnerships involve academics interested in research 
complementarity and resources, and firms seeking skilled and competent partners.  
Our argument is that this matching process plays out differently across academic 
disciplines. Using a UK dataset, we investigate university engagement in 
collaborative research, contract research and consulting. We use official quality 
assessment data derived from the UK Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) to 
measure the quality of university faculty in various fields. This approach is novel in 
that we use income data for different types of collaboration across all academic 
disciplines whereas previous studies have used frequency counts of individual 
engagement in different types of interactions and/or have been limited to specific 
disciplines (Louis et al., 1989; D'Este and Patel, 2007).  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the research on the impact of 
faculty quality on various types of university technology transfer. We then develop 
hypotheses on how faculty quality informs industry involvement, taking account of 
three factors: complementarity between academic and industry work; mobilisation of 
resources by academics; and partner selection by industry. This leads to specific 
hypotheses for different disciplinary groups. We exploit data from a UK government 
survey (HEBCI - Higher Education Business and Community Interaction) of the 164 
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universities in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. We report our results 
and discuss our findings in relation to the literature, and derive implications for 
practice.  
2. Previous research: Faculty quality and engagement 
in technology transfer  
Extant research has explored how faculty quality relates to engagement in technology 
transfer using two main measures and various levels of analysis from the university to 
the department to the individual. One frequently used measure is faculty patenting. 
Both university-level and individual-level analyses show a predominantly positive 
relationship between faculty quality and involvement in patenting (Coupé, 2003; 
Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Stephan, 2007; Carayol, 2007; Van Looy et al., 2006; Breschi 
et al., 2007). Another popular measure is academic entrepreneurship, where again, the 
evidence seems to indicate a positive relationship between faculty quality and 
involvement in commercialization activities (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; O'Shea et 
al., 2005). The findings are similar from individual level studies of ‘star scientists’ 
(Zucker and Darby, 1996; Lowe and Gonzalez-Brambila, 2007). The literature, 
therefore, indicates that faculty quality is largely positively related to technology 
transfer along the two measures referred to above. Academics who generate high 
numbers of publications in peer-reviewed journals also excel at patenting and 
academic entrepreneurship.  
However, compared to alternative modes of interaction (Table 1), patenting and 
academic entrepreneurship are only moderately important means through which 
industry appropriates university-generated knowledge (Arundel and Geuna, 2004; 
Perkmann and Walsh, 2007; Faulkner and Senker, 1994; D'Este and Patel, 2007). 
Roessner (1993), drawing on survey evidence relating to different interaction 
channels, finds that US research and development (R&D) executives place the highest 
value on contract research, followed by co-operative research, with licensing judged 
as less relevant. According to the Carnegie Mellon Survey on industrial R&D, US 
R&D executives regard consulting, contract research and joint research as more 
relevant channels than licensing (Cohen et al., 2002). Similar results pointing to the 
relatively low importance of intellectual property (IP) transfer were found by a 
number of other studies (Levin et al., 1987; Klevorick et al., 1995; Mansfield, 1991; 
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Pavitt, 1991; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Schartinger et al., 2002; D'Este and 
Patel, 2007).  
---------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
In this paper we focus on these relational forms of engagement. For brevity, we use 
the term ‘industry engagement’ to refer to collaborative research, contract research 
and consulting. Collaborative (or joint) research refers to formal collaborative 
arrangements aimed at cooperation on R&D projects (Hall et al., 2001). In many 
cases, the content of this research can be considered ‘pre-competitive’, and these 
projects are often subsidized by public funding. Contract research, on the other hand, 
refers to research that is directly commercially relevant to firms and, therefore, is 
usually ineligible for public support. Contract research is explicitly commissioned by 
firms and the work is usually more applied than in collaborative research 
arrangements (Van Looy et al., 2004). Finally, consulting refers to research or 
advisory services provided by individual academic researchers to their industry clients 
(Perkmann and Walsh, 2008). Consultancy projects are typically commissioned 
directly by the industry partner and the income derived from them often accrues to 
individuals although it can be channelled through university research accounts to 
support research. Studies of academic consulting are hampered by the fact that many 
consulting activities go unreported (Thursby et al., 2009; Abramovsky et al., 2004). 
However, a number of both quantitative and qualitative studies suggest consulting is a 
widespread practice among academic researchers, with most authors finding a positive 
relationship between faculty quality and consulting engagement (Boyer and Lewis, 
1984; Louis et al., 1989; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). 
Industry engagement brings together academics and industry to work jointly on 
projects, often to complete rather than initiate industry R&D projects (Cohen et al., 
2002). The figures for the UK illustrate the economic value that firms attribute to 
these interactions (Table 2) and suggest that universities’ income from contract 
research exceeds the income from intellectual property rights (IPR) by a multiple of 
15. The ratio is similar for collaborative research, although the predominant share of 
this income is derived from government grants.  
 7
---------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
How is faculty quality related to industry engagement? Published evidence is scant. A 
study of US life scientists revealed that individuals involved in consulting generate 
more publications than their non-consulting colleagues (Louis et al., 1989). 
Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005) established that Norwegian professors who receive 
large amounts of industry funding publish more than their colleagues. Also, the 
quality of the university has been found to increase industry’s utilisation of academic 
research (Tornquist and Kallsen, 1994).  
However, a study by Blumenthal et al. (1996) suggests that while academics who 
receive large amounts of industry funding also publish more, their publishing output 
decreases when the ratio of funding from industry relative to public sources exceeds 
two-thirds. Goldfarb (2008), in a study on the US, found that the rate of academics’ 
publishing declined if they maintained a relationship with a user sponsor, such as 
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration). A UK study indicates that 
engineering faculty in departments with lower research rankings are more likely to 
engage in multiple relationships with industry (D'Este and Patel, 2007). According to 
data from the US Research Value Mapping Program survey, the higher the average 
academic quality of an institution, the lower the propensity of individual scientists to 
interact with the private sector (Ponomariov, 2008).  
Finally, Mansfield’s (1995) and Mansfield and Lee’s (1996) studies suggest that 
academics’ industry involvement is correlated with research quality and department 
size. However, discipline-specific analysis shows that research quality is only 
significant and positive for the electronics and petroleum sectors, with results for the 
information processing, drugs and chemicals sectors being inconclusive. In addition, 
of the academic research findings classed by industry respondents as valuable, 
approximately 40% originated in universities with ‘adequate-to-good’ and ‘marginal’, 
rather than ‘good-to-distinguished’ faculties (Mansfield and Lee, 1996). Overall, 
according to the National Academy of Science rankings, approximately 62% of 
industry support for R&D at the 200 US universities with the largest R&D 
expenditures went to universities rated as ‘adequate to good’, not to the elite 
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universities (Mansfield and Lee, 1996). These findings suggest that ‘second tier’ 
departments play a significant role in industry’s search for partners.  
3. Hypothesis development 
3.1. Conceptualising industry engagement 
The above review indicates firstly, that much previous work on the propensity of 
universities to engage in technology transfer has focused on IP transfer and academic 
entrepreneurship and secondly, that analyses of collaborative research, contract 
research and consulting are relatively scarce and yield ambiguous results. In addition, 
distinctions have not been made between different types of involvement and the 
relationship with research quality. In this paper, we address these unresolved issues.   
Our objective is to shed more light on how relational involvement is related to faculty 
quality. We put particular emphasis on the task environment prevailing in different 
disciplines, hypothesising that the ambiguous results in the literature might be 
informed by discipline-specific differences. We postulate that the different ways in 
which academic research is pursued across disciplines determines the benefits 
academics derive from collaborating with industry. If different disciplines represent 
different task environments, patterns of industry collaboration will vary accordingly.  
To address this issue, we consider the drivers that inform the decisions of academics 
and industry to collaborate. Theoretically, university-industry relationships are 
examples of inter-organizational relationships, which can be motivated by a variety of 
rationales, such as efficiency, reciprocity or stability (Oliver, 1990). Collaboration 
between academia and industry is voluntary and, hence, collaboration will depend on 
anticipated benefits (Carayol, 2003). At the same time, collaboration involves 
competition in the sense that partners sort themselves into partnerships depending on 
their bargaining positions, which, in turn, depend on their characteristics (Mindruta, 
2008). In this respect, university-industry collaboration is analogous to other matching 
processes, including the formation of business relationships, inter-firm contracting, or 
even marriage and employment (Mortensen, 1988; Becker, 1973). Each party enters 
the relationship willingly and the counter-parties must agree if a match is to be 
achieved (Stuart and Sorenson, 2007). 
In our specific case, three drivers are particularly relevant. On the one hand, the 
decisions of academic researchers to work with industry are informed by two 
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rationales: the benefits from the complementarities between their academic work and 
industry engagement, and the acquisition of additional resources for research. On the 
other hand, industry partners’ reasons for involvement are based on accessing 
academic expertise to benefit their R&D and/or improvement activities. In what 
follows, we discuss these driving forces in more detail and develop hypotheses about 
how they relate to the task environments of different academic disciplines.  
For academic researchers, the decision to work with firms is likely to be informed 
significantly by whether this will complement their research (D'Este and Perkmann, 
2010). The institutional academic work environment provides powerful incentives for 
individuals to perform according to the established norms for career progression and 
assignment of status (Merton, 1973). Furthermore, the higher the standing of a 
researcher in the academic community, the more their decision will be influenced by 
the impact that working with industry will have on their academic productivity. More 
accomplished researchers work in higher-rated departments that place higher value on 
academic output (Allison and Long, 1990; Crane, 1965). They also belong to peer 
networks where there is more pressure to perform according to academic metrics 
(Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). Such researchers, therefore, will choose to work with 
industry if the research is complementary to their academic work. Complementarity 
refers to the relation between pairs of inputs in the sense of relationships between 
groups of activities (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Rather than solely focusing on 
value creation in the commercial domain, by engaging in intensive collaboration with 
industry, academics seek to create both industrial and academic value. Working with 
industry will complement academic research if it provides opportunities for learning 
via novel insights, ideas and techniques that eventually result in published scientific 
research. It might be difficult to find complementarity if the outputs from working 
with industry are not sufficiently novel to be accepted for publication in academic 
journals. Equally, collaboration might generate time and resources pressures, thereby 
reducing the ability to concentrate on academically relevant outputs (Calderini et al., 
2007). In other words, particularly academics with high standing will more likely 
engage with industry if it increases their research output.  
A second important consideration for academic researchers is that industry partners 
represent a source of research funding (Louis et al., 1989; Geisler, 1995). In Western 
Europe (EU15), the share of business-funded R&D performed in higher education and 
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government laboratories was 6.6% in 2002-2003.1 In the US, industry’s overall share 
of support for academic R&D was approximately 5% in 2003.2 Even though the share 
of industry funding in overall university research monies appears relatively low, this 
share is significantly skewed towards certain disciplines. For instance, in the UK, 52% 
of industry funding accrues to seven out of a total of 69 disciplines assessed in the 
2001 RAE.3  
Grants and contracts from industry have a significant effect on the propensity of 
academic researchers to work with industry (Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007). There is 
evidence that public funding and industry funding are complementary in the sense that 
researchers who receive considerable grants from both industry and public sources 
have a higher propensity for involvement with industry (Bozeman and Gaughan, 
2007). Similarly, academics’ engagement in ‘informal’ technology transfer, i.e. 
transfer of commercial technology, publications co-authored with industry scientists, 
and consulting, is positively correlated with the volume of their research grants (Link 
et al., 2007). In many countries, public science funding bodies encourage academic 
researchers to seek matching funding from commercial organizations (Behrens and 
Gray, 2001; D'Este and Patel, 2007). Overall, the evidence indicates that many 
academic researchers seek to attract industry funding to increase the overall resources 
available for research.  
The third factor informing the matching process between universities and firms is 
firms’ motives. Firms work with universities to solicit assistance with specific R&D 
projects (Cohen et al., 2002), but at the same time they also seek more generic 
benefits such as accessing students, gaining insights on emerging technologies and 
enhancing their knowledge base (Feller, 2005; Caloghirou et al., 2001). The funds that 
firms spend on working with universities constitutes a conservative indicator of the 
value that they attach to this kind of knowledge sourcing because their contributions 
are often matched by public funds. The value may be derived from creating new 
knowledge in collaborative research projects and from exploiting existing expertise 
                                                 
1 Source: OECD, MSTI database, May 2005.  
2 National Science Foundation, online resource 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c5/c5h.htm#c5hl1, accessed 16/11/08.  
3 In order of ranking, these disciplines are: hospital-based clinical Subjects; mechanical, 
aeronautical and manufacturing engineering; chemistry; general engineering; biological sciences; 
business and management studies; and electrical and electronic engineering. We are grateful to Surya 
Mahdi for providing this information (data source: 2001 RAE).  
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during consulting assignments. In any case, these benefits are more likely to accrue 
through collaboration with high-quality partners. Thus, firms can be expected to seek 
the most skilled and highly reputed collaborators possible. In addition, for firms, the 
choice is often influenced by considerations of reputation: industry scientists’ co-
authorship of academic papers with academic collaborators will signal the intellectual 
leadership of their companies (Hicks, 1995). This in turn increases the ability to 
recruit talented graduate students and researchers from top universities. Overall, then, 
we can expect that, given the choice, firms will prefer to work with high-quality 
academic researchers.   
In developing our hypotheses, we will pay attention to a particular feature of the 
science system, relating to the strongly skewed distribution of outputs and rewards 
among scientists (Zuckerman, 1970; Merton, 1968). A relatively small number of 
‘star scientists’ account for a disproportionate amount of publications and citations 
(Zucker and Darby, 1996). Merton (1968), in his characterization of the ‘Matthew 
effect’, described how the high status of star scientists provides them with a 
disproportionate advantage when acquiring resources, which in turn enhance their 
scientific productivity. Star scientists have also been found to outperform their 
colleagues in terms of external engagement and commercialization (Zucker and 
Darby, 1996). Below, we will take into account the special status of star scientists by 
considering their drivers to engage with industry compared to the mainstream 
population of scientists.  
3.2. Hypotheses relating to differences across disciplines  
Here, we consider the roles of the three factors discussed in the matching process 
leading to university-industry collaboration. We suggest that the relationship between 
high-quality academic work and industry engagement depends on the discipline-
specific task environment, and develop this argument with reference to discipline 
groups with different characteristics.  
First we discuss the technology-oriented disciplines. Within the ‘sciences of the 
artificial’ (Simon, 1969), such as engineering, the object of research is often 
constituted by evolving technological artefacts. Engineering research is aimed 
ultimately at problem solving for practical ends, and involves gathering knowledge 
about the functioning or non-functioning of technological processes and artefacts, as 
documented, for instance, the early aviation industry (Vincenti, 1990). Among the 
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various methods of knowledge gathering relevant to engineering projects, academic 
engineers specialize in more theoretical methods rather than direct trials (Vincenti, 
1990). In many cases, academic engineering research remains closely linked to 
industry technology developments, which constitute the main focus for the creation of 
new technology (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). Academic engineers work with 
industry, therefore, not just to access research materials, but also to gather information 
about where to direct their research (Balconi et al., 2004). In turn, this research 
facilitates and inspires technological progress, hence generating potential benefits for 
industry (Klevorick et al., 1995). For academic researchers interested in the design, 
development and use of technological artefacts, therefore, working with industry is 
likely to be highly complementary with their academic research performance. This 
may explain why, in technology-oriented disciplines specifically, high degrees of 
university-industry interaction are associated with high research performance (Balconi 
and Laboranti, 2006; Mansfield, 1995). Even for star researchers in technology-
oriented disciplines, there is considerable academic value in engaging with industry. 
In addition to providing complementarities with academic research, working with 
industry will in many cases enhance scientists’ resource position as they are able to 
attract industry funding for contract research and consulting. We therefore postulate:  
Hypothesis 1a: In technology-oriented academic disciplines, faculty quality is 
positively related to industry engagement. 
Hypothesis 1b: In technology-oriented academic disciplines, having the status of star 
scientists is positively related to industry engagement. 
The relationship between faculty quality and industry engagement in the basic 
sciences differs from that in the technology-oriented disciplines. Basic science 
continues to be dominated by usage considerations in the sense that research problems 
and subjects are inspired by goals informed by industry or society as a whole (Stokes, 
1997). However, there is less need to engage interactively with technology producers. 
Once the broad goals have been set, research in the university laboratory can proceed 
without constant reference to user considerations. For instance, Pasteur carried out 
fundamental research  into the spoilage of milk and wine, identifying the action of 
microorganisms as responsible cause (Stokes, 1997). In this type of research, once the 
practical problem is identified, the research on the fundamental process can proceed 
without constant interaction with users.  
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In this context, industry engagement might lack complementarity with academic 
research. Specifically, consulting and contract research are aimed at resolving 
problems or providing guidance for ongoing firm R&D, as opposed to pursing novelty 
(Gibbons, 2000). Hence, these activities usually leverage ‘old science’ (Rosenberg, 
1994; Allen, 1977; Gibbons and Johnston, 1974). For academics working in basic 
science disciplines, providing such ‘research services’ may not be complementary to 
novelty-driven academic research and, as a result, they may view consulting as having 
lower academic value (Boyer and Lewis, 1984). In a UK survey, academics identified 
two main barriers to engaging in consulting: it was ‘not interesting’, and it had a 
‘limiting impact on their career’ (Howells et al., 1998). Hence, many academics 
perceive a trade-off between applied industrial work and their academic research.  
While basic science might not require high levels of interactivity with developers of 
industrial technology to generate high-quality academic outcomes, it is nonetheless 
resource-intensive and many academics may choose to complement their public 
science funding with industry funds (Blumenthal et al., 1996; Bozeman and Gaughan, 
2007). However, industry funding is likely to have some conditions attached to it, 
raising questions about the influence sponsors might wish to exert on the direction or 
even outcomes of research, and potential conflicts of interest (Krimsky, 2003). While 
in the sciences of the artificial these prospective drawbacks are compensated for by 
the benefits from interactive learning, in the basic sciences these benefits are less 
clear. Basic researchers with sufficient public funding may be less reliant on industry 
funding, for example. As faculty quality tends to be positively related to the ability to 
attract public science funding, less accomplished researchers might be more inclined 
to tap industry sources of funding than their top-ranked counterparts. This needs to be 
adjusted for the fact, however, that industry will want to partner with the best-possible 
academic researchers who are prepared to accept industry funding. Overall this 
suggests a matching scenario where good researchers engage with industry, but where 
the most excellent researchers pursue alternative sources of funding:  
Hypothesis 2a: In the basic science disciplines, faculty quality is positively related to 
industry engagement. 
Hypothesis 2b: In the basic science disciplines, having the status of star scientists is 
negatively related with industry engagement.   
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There are also a number disciplines that are ‘basic’, but require smaller amounts of 
resources; this includes many fields in the social sciences. In these disciplines, we 
would expect the relationship dynamics to be similar to the basic sciences in the sense 
that research is usually not closely related to evolving ‘technologies’. For instance, in 
management research – the social science discipline with the highest level of industry 
funding in the UK – the lack of connection between theory and practice is widely 
acknowledged (Van De Ven and Johnson, 2006; Gulati, 2007). Social science 
research considered excellent is usually not concerned with developing practical 
applications but aims at developing representations of social, economic and 
organizational realities from a sceptical distance (McKelvey, 1997). While proponents 
who regard the social science as a ‘design science’ push for a stronger consideration 
of application (Romme, 2003), this does not reflect the mainstream view amongst 
most social scientists. This means that academic researchers do not have a particular 
need to interact with industrial partners in order to produce high-quality research. In 
other words, complementarity is likely to be low. Furthermore, as social science is 
less resource-intensive than science research, there is less pressure for academics to 
complement public funding with industry funds. Taking both complementarity and 
resource drivers into account, the relationship between faculty quality and industry 
involvement is likely to be negative. For star scientists, the relationship is also likely 
to be negative as they are even less dependent on industry resources and therefore 
have fewer incentives for engaging in collaboration given that complementarities are 
absent.  
Hypothesis 3a: In the social sciences, faculty quality is negatively related to industry 
engagement.  
Hypothesis 3b: In the social sciences, having the status of star scientists is negatively 
related to industry engagement.   
Below, we examine our hypotheses drawing on data from UK universities.  
4. Data and methods  
4.1 Data  
Our data on UK universities are drawn from the 2005 Higher Education Business and 
Community Interaction (HEBCI) survey, and the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise 
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(RAE), supplemented by data from the UK’s Higher Education Statistical Agency 
(HESA). Because the provision of these data is mandatory, our dataset includes the 
complete population of 164 higher education institutions (HEIs) in the UK in 2003/04. 
In this paper, we refer to all HEIs as universities except when directly reporting 
responses to a question in the HEBCI survey.  
The annual HEBCI survey is issued by the UK’s four higher education funding 
councils - for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The survey captures 
numeric indicators and financial income arising from ‘business and community 
engagement’, and information on a range of themes covering strategy, infrastructure 
and approaches to the management and commercialization of IP (HEFCE, 2006). 
‘Business’ in this context refers to both public and private sector partners of all sizes 
and from all sectors, with ‘community’ taken to mean wider society, including social, 
civic and cultural organizations and individuals. Our data are drawn largely from the 
‘business’ section of the questionnaire.  
The RAE is performed approximately every six years on behalf of the four funding 
councils to evaluate the quality of research undertaken by UK universities. RAE 
submissions from each subject area (‘unit of assessment’) are ranked by a subject 
specialist peer review panel. These rankings are used to inform the allocation of 
quality-weighted research funding received by each HEI from their national funding 
council.  
Dependent variables 
We operationalize universities’ industry engagement using measures of the income 
derived from different forms of engagement. These measures are based on the 
financial section of the HEBCI survey for the academic year 2003/04. Each university 
reports its income from collaborative research, contract research and consulting. For 
contract research and consulting only, detailed information about the source of 
funding is provided, including information on income from local organizations (i.e. 
those located in the university’s region) and from public organizations, small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and large firms. We calculated per capita income 
figures for each of these categories by dividing total income by the total number of 
academic staff (full time equivalents - FTEs) at each university, derived from RAE 
data.   
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We use several dependent variables, representing different types of income or specific 
components thereof. Our first three dependent variables are represented by per capita 
income from collaborative research (COLLABOR), contract research (CONTRACT) 
and consulting (CONSULT). We also considered per capita income from commercial 
organizations, for contract research and consulting separately (Firms: CONTRACT, 
Firms: CONSULT). Further per capita income figures refer to total contract and 
consulting income from local organizations (LOCAL), SMEs (SME) and large firms 
(LARGE).  
Measures of faculty quality  
For our purposes, we equate faculty quality with their standing in the research 
community and hence we refer to faculty research quality. We derived measures of 
research excellence from the 2001 RAE return for each university, pertaining to 
research activity and output during the five years up to 2000. Since RAE data is 
collected only approximately every six years, the 2001 data is the most relevant for 
the period of 2003/04. For each unit of assessment (roughly equating to a discipline) 
where universities choose to make a RAE submission, they are awarded one of the 
following scores: 5*, 5, 4, 3a, 3b, 2, 1. The highest score, 5*, equates to international 
excellence in more than half of the research activity submitted and attainable levels of 
national excellence in the remainder; the 1 score equates to national excellence in 
virtually none of the activities submitted. RAE scores have been previously used as an 
indicator of research quality at both university (McGuinness, 2003; D'Este and Patel, 
2007; Ambos et al., 2008) and regional level (Abramovsky et al., 2007). RAE data 
were collected across 69 units of assessment - roughly corresponding to disciplines – 
which were grouped into five discipline groupings (see Table 10, Annex): physical 
sciences and engineering, medical and biological sciences, social studies, arts and 
humanities, and area studies and languages. Our five categories reflect the panels 
adopted by the UK government for the purposes of carrying out the 2001 RAE; 
subjects were grouped into disciplines on the basis of having similar approaches to 
research. 
In our analysis, we focus on the three biggest discipline groupings. We regard the 
physical and engineering sciences as representative of the technology-oriented 
disciplines as, according to RAE data, most industry income in this category accrues 
to the engineering subjects. In turn, we conceptualize the medical and biological 
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sciences as basic as most industry income benefits the biological sciences and 
clinical-based subjects – the latter are data collection exercises to allow analysis of 
physiological and molecular processes. To measure faculty quality, we constructed 
two measures for each discipline grouping. The first measure which we call ‘standard 
research quality’, represents the share of ‘good’ researchers in each university. We 
operationalize this as a proportion of research-active staff in each discipline grouping, 
calculated by dividing the number of research-active staff in each grouping with an 
RAE score of 4 or above by the total number of academic staff in that grouping. Table 
3 shows how faculty quality is distributed across all universities.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
This measure controls for the size of each discipline group at each university, 
mirroring our use of per capita income figures as the dependent variables. We 
constructed our measure in the following way. As only the number of research active 
staff in each unit of assessment was reported, we had to estimate the total number of 
staff (FTE) for each unit of assessment. We were able to do this because the RAE data 
report the proportion of research active staff for each unit of assessment (within a 
range), relative to the total number of staff. We used the midpoint of the range to 
estimate total academic staff numbers for each discipline group. Then, for each of the 
five discipline groupings, we divided the number of research-active staff (in FTEs) in 
each unit of assessment that received a RAE score of 4 or above, by the estimated 
total number of academic staff of the respective discipline grouping. This generated 
five variables for each university: the proportion of ‘good’ researchers in the Physical 
and Engineering Sciences (PHYS), Medical and Biological Sciences (MED), Social 
Sciences (SOC), Arts and Humanities (ARTS), and Area Studies and Languages 
(LANG).4 In our analysis, we focus on the explanatory power of faculty quality in the 
three largest discipline groupings (PHYS, MED, SOC) but we retain the measures in 
the smaller disciplines (ARTS, LANG) to control for the possible impact they may 
have on determining universities’ income from industry interaction.  
                                                 
4 University of Manchester and London Metropolitan University had been involved in mergers in the 
period between the 2001 RAE and the 2005 HEBCI survey. The RAE returns for the pre-merger 
institutions were combined. 
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The second measure which we call ‘star research quality’ reflects the presence of star 
scientists. We constructed a dummy variable reflecting whether a university had at 
least one department classified as 5* in a given discipline grouping. This resulted in 
the following variables, indicating researchers in ‘excellent’ departments: PHYS*, 
MED*, SOC*, ARTS*, and LANG*. These measures moderate the effect of faculty 
quality by adding a marker for top-rated researchers. Taken together, these two 
measures allow us to account for any threshold effects by distinguishing between 
‘good’ and ‘excellent’ researchers. The variables used are summarized in Table 4.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Our quality measures apply to departments and not individuals, and therefore the 
results of our analysis refer to how the quality of departments of a university relates to 
its engagement with industry. This may be justified by the fact that within 
departments there may be a relative homogeneity of individuals in terms of their 
research quality but our results should nevertheless be read as applying to an 
organizational level and not an individual level.  
Control variables  
We used a number of control variables to account for effects unrelated to research 
quality.  
The total number of staff in the institution (in FTEs), FTEtotal, was included in order 
to control for size effects. A positive coefficient indicates that the returns per staff 
member are greater when the institution is larger. This variable is derived from 
HESA’s annual report of staff FTEs. 
Since some UK universities are highly specialized (say, covering only the arts or 
medical sciences) we included a measure of specialization (SPECIALIZE) for each 
university, using a Herfindahl index. The proportion of total staff (FTE) in each of the 
five discipline groups is squared, and the squares summed to give a value ranging 
from 0.2 (an equal spread across all five areas) to 1 (activities within only one of the 
five areas).  
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We capture differences in terms of organizational heritage with a dummy variable 
(Post1992). ‘Post-1992’ universities were previously classified as tertiary education 
teaching institutions (‘polytechnics’) in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and 
Central Institutions in Scotland, and were mostly established during the 1960s’ 
expansion of higher education in the UK. Their original remit was to teach both 
academic and practical subjects with a focus on engineering and applied science, 
although they subsequently created departments in other fields. Under the Further and 
Higher Education Act, 1992 they were nominated universities, but retain many of 
their original features, in particular a closeness to employers’ vocational interests and 
routine engagement with business. D’Este and Patel (2007) report that science and 
engineering researchers at post-1992 universities engage in a wider variety of 
interactions with industry, although these findings apply to collaboration in basic 
rather than applied physical sciences.  
We also include variables to capture the university’s infrastructure and rules 
supporting university-industry collaboration. Survey respondents reported how many 
of their university staff (FTEs) were employed in a dedicated ‘business and 
community function’ to engage with (a) commercial partners and (b) public sector 
partners. Based on these responses we created the variables STAFFcom (the 
proportion of staff engaged with commercial partners) and STAFFpub (the proportion 
of staff engaged with public sector partners).  
We identified the existence of strategic plans for industry engagement (HEIplan) from 
the responses to the question: Does your HEI have a strategic plan for business 
support? Responses were scored on a scale ranging from 1 (no strategic plan in place; 
ad hoc approach to business support), through 3 (strategic plan developed and only 
partially implemented, or restricted to certain departments or central functions only) 
to 5 (strategic plan developed as a result of an inclusive process across the whole 
university; accepted across almost all units and recommendations implemented; use of 
plan to set targets and monitor achievement). Intervening responses related to between 
1 and 3 or between 3 and 5.  
With regard to the rules for disclosure, respondents were asked about the requirement 
within the HEI to report inventions, choosing one of three possible responses: always, 
usually, or rarely/never. We created a binary variable (Disclose) to indicate either a 
requirement to always or usually report inventions, or rarely or never to do so. We 
 20
used a measure (Mature) to evaluate the university’s experience in supporting 
consulting links, derived from the age of the department, to manage consultancy links 
and other external interactions with missing values set to zero. Finally, following 
Siegel et al. (2003), we included a measure (Regional) reflecting overall R&D 
expenditure by business in university’s local region.  
4.2 Method  
In Section 5, we present the results of the regressions for the various dependent 
variables. Due to a prevalence of zeros in the dependent variables, all models use 
Tobit estimations (Greene, 1990). Our regressions employ econometric model 
specifications that incorporate the explanatory variables described above. The number 
of observations in the regressions was 132, which was due to some missing values 
(which are discussed further below). Given the potential for correlation between 
various university characteristics, we test for the presence of multicollinearity using 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs). For all model specifications, the VIFs are 
sufficiently low (below 4) to infer that multicollinearity poses no significant problem 
for our study. For each model, we report sigma and the value of the Likelihood 
Function, but, unfortunately, there is no accepted goodness-of-fit statistic for Tobit 
estimation. 
5. Results  
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for our key 
variables.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 5, 6, 7 and 8 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6 presents average values (per capita income figures) separately for post-1992 
universities and Russell Group universities. Post-1992 universities are less research-
active institutions with a focus on teaching (see above), while Russell Group 
universities include the most research-intensive universities in the UK. The figures 
show that per capita income is considerably higher in research-intensive universities 
than in less research-intensive institutions, with the exception of consulting income, 
which is relatively evenly distributed across all types of universities.  
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Below, we present the results of our econometric models taking account of 
disciplinary differences. First, we consider our results for income from the three types 
of industry engagement – collaborative research (COLLABOR), contract research 
(CONTRACT) and consultancy (CONSULT) (Table 7). Regression 1 provides 
evidence that income from collaborative research is positively associated with 
standard research quality in the Social Sciences (SOC; p=0.001) and star research 
quality in area studies and languages (LANG; p=0.030), but negatively associated 
with star research quality in the medical and biological sciences. No significant effect 
is found to be associated with star research quality in either the arts and humanities or 
the physical and engineering sciences. Income from collaborative research is also 
positively affected by a requirement to disclose inventions (Disclose; p=0.000) and is 
higher for the universities that are more narrowly focused across disciplines 
(Specialize; p=0.026).  
The results are somewhat different for contract research income, CONTRACT. 
Regression 2 in Table 7 shows a positive effect for standard research quality in the 
medical and biological sciences (MED; p=0.000), but no other discipline is associated 
with a significant influence. Also, unlike the previously discussed measure, 
CONTRACT is found to be increasing with university size (Size; p=0.044), which 
implies a significant degree of increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, we find that 
having a strategic plan for industry engagement has a positive impact on contract 
research income (Strategy; p=0.003), and that regional expenditure on R&D has a 
(somewhat surprising) negative effect on these income streams. 
For income from consultancy (CONSULT) the results differ again. Regression 3 
shows a positive effect associated with star research quality researchers in both the 
physical and engineering sciences (PHYS*; p=0.002) and the social sciences (SOC*; 
p=0.060). We also find consulting income to be positively affected by the 
employment of staff to engage with commercial partners within a dedicated business 
and community function (STAFFcom; p=0.021), but to be negatively associated with 
university size, which implies a significant degree of decreasing returns to scale. 
Income from relationships with local organizations (LOCAL), reported in column 4 
of Table 8, is significantly influenced by only the presence and composition of 
research quality. More specifically, there is a positive effect associated with standard 
research quality in both the physical and engineering sciences (PHYS; p=0.008) and 
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the arts and humanities (ARTS; p=0.085) but a negative effect associated with 
research quality in the Social Sciences (SOC; p=0.094). 
Next we look at those parts of the incomes from contract research and consulting that 
accrue from relationships with firms only, the results of which are reported in 
Regressions 5 and 6 in Table 8. For contract research, the results for firms only can be 
usefully contrasted with those for the more aggregate measure in Regression 2. There 
are three key differences: while we find a positive effect from standard research 
quality in the medical and biological sciences (MED; p=0.000), we find a negative 
association with star research quality in the social sciences (SOC; p=0.088) for only 
firm-related contract research; the negative effect of regional R&D expenditures on 
the aggregate measure disappears once the focus is on relationships with firms only; 
and the more specific measure, unlike the case for CONTRACT, is positively affected 
by the requirement to disclose inventions (Disclose; p=0.042). 
For consulting, the results for firms can be usefully contrasted with those reported for 
the corresponding aggregate measure in Regression 3. Again, there are some 
differences: a positive effect of star research quality in the physical and engineering 
sciences is found for both (PHYS*; p=0.017 for firm-related income); while star 
research quality in the Social Sciences has a positive effect on aggregate consulting 
income, no such effect is found for the more specific measure; for firm-related 
consulting there is a negative association with star research quality in area studies and 
languages (LANG*; p=0.026); and we find that standard research quality in the 
medical and biological sciences has a positive effect on firm-related, but not 
aggregate, consulting income (MED; p=0.093) and the decreasing returns to scale 
result is absent for the more specific measure. In addition, unlike CONSULT, firm-
related consulting income is positively affected by the requirement to disclose 
inventions (Disclose; p=0.074). 
Finally, we turn to our measures of income disaggregated by type of firm – SME and 
LARGE – whose results are reported in Regressions 7 and 8 in Table 8. For SME, 
similarly to the results for local organizations, we find a positive effect associated 
with standard research quality in both the physical and engineering sciences (PHYS; 
p=0.042) and the arts and humanities (ARTS; p=0.064), but a negative effect 
associated with standard research quality in the Social Sciences (SOC; p=0.062). 
However, we find the effect on income from SMEs is positive for star research quality 
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in the physical and engineering sciences (PHYS*; p=0.008), and that relationships 
with SMEs are significantly less fruitful in the presence of star research quality in the 
medical and biological sciences (MED*; p=0.009), but are improved by the 
employment of staff to engage with commercial partners (STAFFcom; p=0.023). 
We find that a requirement to disclose inventions promotes income from relationships 
with both SMEs and large firms (Disclose; p=0.097 and p=0.058, respectively), but 
with the exception of this effect, the results for large firms are starkly different from 
those for SMES and local firms. We find evidence that income from relationships 
with large firms is positively affected by standard research quality in the Medical and 
biological Sciences (MED; p=0.000) and negatively associated with star research 
quality in Area studies and languages (LANG; p=0.038). Furthermore, there is 
evidence of increasing returns to scale (Size; p=0.008), and positive effects associated 
with both the existence of strategic plans for industry engagement (Strategy; p=0.025) 
and a narrower focus across disciplines (Specialize; p=0.056).  
We lose a number of observations due to a lack of data availability. Out of the 164 
universities surveyed by HEBCI, 132 enter our sample. This arises because some 
institutions’ survey responses were incomplete and also because some made no RAE 
return. Regarding this loss of information, it is worth emphasising that the institutions 
excluded from the sample are dominated by non-research-active, teaching-only 
colleges that would be a poor fit for our model of knowledge creation, 
collaboration and transfer. For such institutions, the phenomena upon which this study 
focuses reflect at most only peripheral objectives and activities. A few examples of 
excluded institutions are: the Arts Institute at Bournemouth; the Conservatoire for 
Dance and Drama; the Courtauld Institute of Art; the Royal Welsh College of Music 
and Drama; Ravensbourne College of Design and Communication; Trinity Laban; and 
the Royal Academy of Music.  
Table 9 presents a synthesis of the results for various measures of industry 
involvement, including significant results only for the variables relating to faculty 
quality. For the physical and engineering sciences (Hypotheses 1a and 1b), we find 
the proportion of good researchers to be positively related to income from local firms 
as well as SMEs, and the presence of top-rated researchers to be positively related to 
income from contract research and consulting as well as income from SMEs and 
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consulting with firms. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a is supported by two income 
measures, and Hypothesis 1b by four income measures for excellent researchers.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------- 
For the medical and biological sciences (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), we find a generally 
positive relationship between the proportion of good researchers, as indicated by 
standard research quality, and income from firms, and specifically large firms, and 
both contract research and consulting with firms. However, we find a negative 
relationship between the presence of top-rated researchers, as indicated by star 
research quality, and income from collaborative research and from SMEs. Hypothesis 
2a, therefore, is supported by four income measures showing a positive association 
between income and good researchers, and hypothesis 2b is supported by two income 
measures showing a negative association between income and top-rated researchers.  
For the social sciences (Hypotheses 3a and 3b), we find a positive relationship 
between the proportion of good researchers and income from collaborative research. 
However, income from contract research, local firms and SMEs is negatively related 
to the proportion of good researchers. Furthermore, income from consulting is 
positively affected by the presence of top-rated researchers, while income from 
contract research from firms is negatively affected. Thus, there is conflicting evidence 
for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. On the one hand, the hypotheses are supported by three 
income measures showing a negative association between income and good 
researchers, and two income measures showing a negative association between 
income and top-rated researchers. On the other hand, however, there is one income 
measure that shows a positive association with good researchers, and one that shows a 
positive association with top-rated researchers.  
6. Discussion  
This paper provides novel empirical evidence on an aspect of university-industry 
relationships where existing studies are ambiguous and incomplete. Overall, we find 
that the relationship between faculty quality and industry involvement differs 
according to disciplinary orientation. The insights can be summarized as follows.  
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Within the physical and engineering sciences, industry involvement in its various 
guises is positively related to faculty research quality, measured as the proportion of 
good researchers, as well as the presence of top-ranked researchers. The higher a 
department is ranked in terms of research quality, the more likely its members will get 
involved in some type of collaboration with industry. This finding provides some 
support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b, which posited that in technology-oriented 
academic disciplines, faculty quality would be positively related to industry 
engagement. We know from other sources that industry income within the physical 
and engineering sciences is concentrated in applied disciplines such as mechanical 
and manufacturing engineering (Mahdi et al., 2008). Therefore, the positive 
association we find between successful researchers and industry engagement is likely 
to be strongly informed by the presence of the technology-oriented sciences, as 
postulated in our hypotheses.  
In the medical and biological sciences, we encounter a different dynamic. While 
income from firms for contract research and consulting is positively related to the 
proportion of good researchers in a department, for top-ranked departments, this effect 
disappears and even becomes negative for some types of income. This means we find 
some support for Hypothesis 2a that in these disciplines, faculty quality is positively 
related to industry engagement, particularly when it comes to working with large 
firms. However, as proposed in Hypothesis 2b, the very top tier researchers are less 
inclined to work with industry. It appears that in these disciplines, compared to the 
more application-oriented fields in the physical and engineering sciences, the best 
researchers are less dependent on working with industry to pursue top-level research. 
These researchers usually receive more public research grants than lower-ranked 
researchers, and may therefore be less dependent on engaging with outside partners to 
attract resources.  
Where resource requirements play a less important role, such as in the social sciences, 
we would expect a negative relationship between faculty quality and industry 
involvement, as postulated in Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Our results for the social 
sciences are indicative of a such as relationship, although we find a positive 
association between the proportion of good researchers and involvement in 
collaborative research. This indicates that good researchers are attracted by the type of 
relationships with industry that are less applied and where objectives are defined 
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collaboratively. By contrast, the involvement of researchers in relationships where 
objectives are defined more unilaterally by the partners, such as contract research and 
consulting, decreases with research quality.  
A somewhat counter-intuitive finding is that involvement in consulting is positively 
associated with top-ranked researchers. This may indicate that top-ranked social 
science researchers prefer to consult for government, or that governments prefer to 
recruit top-tier researchers for consultancy opportunities. We did not find an 
equivalent relationship regarding consulting for firms, and a negative association 
between researchers’ quality and involvement in contract research for firms, 
suggesting that social scientists’ engagement with firms is not unequivocally related 
to their research quality. Taken together, these findings suggest that matching 
processes between academics and their external collaborators are driven by different 
considerations across scientific disciplines. 
This study contributes to the literature by differentiating the factors shaping matching 
processes in the establishment of university-industry relationships. This type of 
collaboration represents a special case of interorganizational relationship (Oliver, 
1990). Both parties are free to enter these relationships and their decisions will 
therefore be based on the benefits they can expect from collaborating. We have 
argued that match-making is informed by several factors. For academic researchers, 
two considerations are relevant: the task-based complementarity between industry 
work and the their research, and mobilisation of funding from industry. Industry’s 
involvement is promoted by a desire to source knowledge from skilled and reputable 
researchers, resulting in a preference for cooperation with high-quality researchers.  
Within technology-oriented disciplines, high levels of complementarity between top-
level research and its application, increase the tendency for top-ranked researchers to 
work with industrial partners, including SMEs. In these disciplines, firms with 
advanced equipment and materials platforms providing a basis for collaborative 
development of technological artefacts are able to attract the top-ranked academic 
researchers. In contexts of lower levels of complementarity, such as in the medical 
and biological sciences, academic researchers are still motivated to work with 
industry, but perhaps predominantly to access resources. The higher their standing in 
terms of research quality, the more easily they will be able to raise income from 
industry. However, industry partners might have to compromise on research quality, 
 27
since star researchers have recourse to alternative ways of mobilising funds and unlike 
in the technology-oriented disciplines, do not need collaborative development of 
technological artefacts with industry to underpin the quality of their scientific 
research. In turn, when fewer resources are required for research, such as in the social 
sciences, academic researchers with higher standing appear to be less inclined to work 
with industry. For top-tier social scientists, time may be more of a constraint on doing 
academic research than resources, making them very selective about choices of 
partners and projects.  
Our results have implications for the literature on academics’ engagement in 
commercialization (Rothaermel et al., 2007). Existing work finds primarily positive 
relationships between measures of faculty quality, such as publication counts, and 
measures of industry engagement, such as academic entrepreneurship and particularly 
patenting (Baldini, 2008). Patenting data allows for precise analysis, but it represents  
only an indirect measure of academics’ involvement with industry. Data on the 
income from these relationships, used in this paper, are also imperfect but are a closer 
measure of actual involvement with industry. In fact, patents are often the outcome of 
the relationships maintained by academics with industry, for instance, via consulting 
contracts (Thursby et al., 2007). In addition, it is well established that patenting is 
highly skewed across academic disciplines (Geuna and Nesta, 2006) while 
collaborative relationships within industry are more widespread (Schartinger et al., 
2002). Finally, patents intrinsically incorporate scientific and technological findings 
with high degrees of novelty and, therefore, have a high affinity with articles in 
highly-rated academic journals (Murray and Stern, 2007).  
Our results suggest that commercialization behaviour, (patenting and academic 
entrepreneurship), and collaborative involvement (collaborative research, contract 
research and consulting) are driven by different dynamics. Only in certain disciplines 
are high levels of industry collaboration associated with star scientists. It appears that 
the difference between research based on patenting data and collaborative 
engagement, respectively, can be interpreted by making a distinction between value 
appropriation and value creation. Patenting represents a way for academic researchers 
to appropriate some value from their research, and it appears from previous research 
that top-level researchers are always the ones who excel at industrial value 
appropriation. Collaborative engagement, by contrast, can be seen as a value creation 
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activity during which benefits are yet to be generated. Academics’ engagement with 
industry, via relationships such as contract research and consulting, often takes the 
form of providing advice on ongoing R&D work rather than focusing on novel 
technological inventions (Cohen et al., 2002; Perkmann and Walsh, 2009). Our results 
indicate that value creation is not necessarily the exclusive domain of top-ranked 
researchers.  
This emerging picture qualifies some of the claims recently advanced emphasising 
growing complementarities between universities and industry. For instance, the ‘triple 
helix’ theory depicts universities, industry and government as part of a coherent 
system underpinning innovation and economic progress (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 
2000). Better grounded in empirical evidence, Owen-Smith (2003) finds a ‘hybrid 
regime’ linking commercial and academic activities via positive feedback loops. 
According to our findings, these hybrid regimes where the best researchers are always 
those who also engage most with industry, operate in some fields, but not in others. 
Therefore, the universality of the ‘triple helix’ and ‘hybrid regimes’ views should not 
be taken for granted.  
Our analysis represents a first effort to investigate the impact of faculty quality on 
university income in collaborative research, contract research and consulting across a 
broad set of disciplines. However, it has some limitations. First, university-level 
analysis necessarily yields less fine-grained results than would individual or 
department-level analysis. Therefore, our results might neglect potentially relevant 
variables not captured by university-wide measures. For instance, within departments, 
there might be a division of labour between academics who excel in scientific 
publishing and those who ‘specialize’ in working with industry and generate less 
output in terms of publications. However, this limitation should be judged against the 
fact that data on income from industry interactions at departmental or individual level 
are scarce and difficult to collect. Another limitation is that our dependent variables 
only measure income, not necessarily industry involvement. Any involvement with 
firms that does not result in actual income for the university is not captured. This 
might include non-monetary, informal exchanges between academics and industry 
(Kreiner and Schultz, 1993; King, 2006) or consulting income that is not declared to 
the university administration. A third limitation is that our data do not allow us to 
observe whether faculty quality is associated with the ability to engage effectively 
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with industry. An alternative interpretation of our findings for the basic and social 
sciences may be that lower-tier faculty are actually better at understanding the 
problems of and communicating with firms, making them more attractive partners for 
industry. Future research, therefore, should focus on substantiating or rejecting our 
findings.  
7. Conclusion 
We began this paper by asking whether the universities with the most successful 
researchers are also the ones who work most with industry or whether more ‘applied’ 
universities are more successful at establishing relationships with industry despite 
lower academic standing. This question is highly relevant for policy making that 
attempts to balance the quality of scientific production with the diffusion of 
university-generated technologies within the wider economy. Our analysis of UK 
universities revealed that there is no uniform relationship between industry 
involvement and faculty quality across disciplines. For the technology-oriented 
disciplines, the researchers in the best departments are also those with high industry 
involvement. This alignment is due to the high levels of complementarity between 
academic research and technology development. 
For disciplines such as the medical and biological sciences we find that research 
quality is also positively related to industry engagement but interestingly this 
relationship reverses for the very best departments. We attribute this effect to the fact 
that in these disciplines the complementarities between academic research and 
industrial requirements are lower and therefore those researchers with the best access 
to public grants, (i.e. the star scientists), may have to resort to industry funds to a 
lower degree. For the social sciences, which are less resource-intensive, we find a 
mostly negative relationship between faculty quality and particularly the more applied 
forms of industry involvement.   
These findings have implications for universities and policy makers keen to promote 
university engagement with industry. Our results matter because, in terms of overall 
economic impact, the types of industry engagement analysed in this paper are more 
pervasive than IP transfer and academic entrepreneurship. In the technology-oriented 
disciplines, industry involvement is strongly complementary with top-level scientific 
research (Balconi and Laboranti, 2006; Mansfield, 1995). This means the diffusion of 
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university-generated technologies into the economy is progressed through high-
quality scientific production and commercialization in these disciplines, and for that 
reason it may be easier for universities to configure structures, resources and 
incentives to encourage engagement in contract and collaborative research as a means 
to achieve academic excellence.  
Our findings suggest that this complementarity is less apparent in basic and social 
science disciplines. Here, if top quality researchers are not the most active pursuers of 
industry engagement, then there might be a tension between providing incentives for 
such activities, and top-level research, meaning universities must find creative ways 
for managing these different demands. Strategies and policies to promote academics’ 
interactions with industry, universities and policy-makers must be tuned to take 
account of these differences between academic disciplines. Currently, policy-makers 
are considering a division of labour among universities whereby some specialize in 
advanced research and others in business engagement (Sainsbury of Turville, 2007). 
According to our findings, such an arrangement might be appropriate for some 
disciplines, but less so for others.  
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Table 1: Types of university-industry relations  
 
Licensing  Contractual assignment of university-generated 
intellectual property (such as patents) to external 
organizations  
Academic entrepreneurship  Development and commercial exploitation of 
technologies pursued by academic inventors through 
a company they (partly) own 
Collaborative research Research jointly pursued by university and industrial 
partners – commonly with public funding  
Contract research  Application-oriented research and development 
activities carried out by university – commissioned 
and funded by industry  
Consulting  Application-oriented research and development 
activities or advice provided individually by 
academics – commissioned and funded by industry 
Compiled from several sources (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006; Mansfield, 1995; 
Louis et al., 1989). 
 
 
Table 2: UK universities’ income from industry involvement  
Type of interaction with industry  Income 
Collaborative research 541
Contract research 580
Consulting 211
Facilities and equipment 80
Intellectual property (licensing and spin-outs) 38
In Million GBP. Source: Higher Education Funding Council (2006).  
 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of faculty quality across universities 
 Physical and 
Engineering 
Sciences  
Medical and 
biological 
sciences 
Social 
Sciences  
1st Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2nd Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.04 
3rd Quartile 0.42 0.42 0.40 
4th Quartile 0.89 0.88 0.85 
Overall average  0.33 0.33 0.32 
Average proportion of faculty in departments with RAE ratings of 4 or higher, relative 
to total research active staff, for each quartile of universities.  
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Table 4: Independent variables  
PHYS Proportion of good researchers in the Physical and Engineering Sciences  
PHYS* Presence of star researchers in the Physical and Engineering Sciences 
MED Proportion of good researchers in the Medical and Biological Sciences  
MED* Presence of star researchers in the Medical and Biological Sciences 
SOC Proportion of good researchers in the Social Sciences 
SOC* Presence of star researchers in the Social Sciences  
ARTS Proportion of good researchers in the Arts and Humanities 
ARTS* Presence of star researchers in the Arts and Humanities  
LANG Proportion of good researchers in Languages and Area Studies 
LANG* Presence of star researchers in Languages and Area Studies 
Size Number of staff (full-time equivalents)  
Strategy Presence of university strategy for business engagement 
STAFFpub University staff engaged in making links with public sector 
STAFFcom University staff engaged in making links with private sector 
Disclose Presence of policy requiring disclosure of inventions 
Regional Regional Business Expenditure on R&D 
Specialize Degree of disciplinary specialization by university 
Post1992 Indicates status as Post-1992 university (previous ‘polytechnic’) 
Mature Age of university office for managing consulting links 
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Table 6: Average income per member of faculty for different types of universities 
 Collaborative 
Research 
Contract 
research 
Consulting
Post 1992 
universities 
2,049 1,680 1,598 
Russell Group 
universities   
8,748 14,385 2,435 
Other 
universities 
6,827 5,234 2,934 
Average (all 
universities) 
5,069 4,862 2,317 
Figures represent GBP amounts. Faculty members measured as full-time equivalent. 
Source: Higher Education Funding Council (2006)  
 
Table 7: Tobit regression results for three income measures 
 
-8.613 -9.948 ** -1.585
-6.360 4.059 1.164
1.870 -0.949 3.150 ***
2.701 9.164 *** 1.298
-5.854 * 3.179 0.306
16.444 *** 2.703 0.989
0.333 -1.267 1.585 *
-2.882 -2.748 0.120
-1.266 0.347 -1.239
-2.394 -1.836 -1.007
5.885 ** -2.192 -1.133
0.001 0.002 ** -0.001 **
-0.948 2.195 *** 0.401
-21.340 -32.147 -15.018
-16.736 17.549 22.414 **
4.961 *** -0.166 0.651
0.681 -1.597 ** -0.089
10.647 ** 2.946 0.551
1.539 0.935 0.300
0.096 0.096 0.050
1: N=132; Sigma=8.088 (p=0.000); Likelihood function=-416.6
2: N=132; Sigma=5.515 (p=0.000); Likelihood function=-359.9
3: N=132; Sigma=2.807 (p=0.000); Likelihood function=-313.8
LANG*
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of 
confidence, respectively.
ARTS*
SOC*
MED*
PHYS*
Mature
Post1992
Regression
1 32
Variable
Constant
Size
LANG
Regional
STAFFpub
STAFFcom
Strategy
Disclose
PHYS
Dependent variable
COLLAB CONTRACT CONSULT
Specialise
ARTS
SOC
MED
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Table 8: Tobit regression results for income from relationships with firms, 
disaggregated by type of firm and type of relationship 
 
-4.293 -8.859 *** -1.010 0.316 -10.203 ***
5.430 *** 2.538 0.926 1.044 ** 1.773
-1.805 -1.248 1.150 ** 0.888 *** -1.006
-0.021 7.423 *** 0.989 * 0.174 8.878 ***
0.635 0.576 -0.497 -0.877 *** 1.063
-4.062 * 1.666 0.316 -1.102 * 2.961
1.493 -1.963 * -0.233 -0.040 -2.036
2.718 * -2.742 0.247 0.767 * -2.642
-0.773 -0.332 -0.330 -0.460 -0.026
2.296 -2.220 -0.483 0.113 -2.518
1.020 -2.054 -1.020 ** -0.141 -3.035 **
0.000 0.003 ** 0.000 0.000 0.002 ***
0.145 1.051 ** 0.215 -0.086 1.228 **
26.481 -24.524 -5.261 -1.035 -18.031
7.319 6.529 14.554 *** 7.245 ** 14.012
0.118 1.304 ** 0.369 * 0.238 * 1.304 *
-0.204 -0.195 -0.017 0.094 -0.307
1.831 4.138 * -0.147 -0.369 4.697 *
1.230 -0.299 -0.141 -0.383 0.468
-0.026 0.034 -0.018 -0.013 0.030
4: N=132; Sigma=3.267 (p=0.000); Likelihood function=-247.9
5: N=132; Sigma=3.780 (p=0.000); Likelihood function=-305.0
6: N=132; Sigma=1.317 (p=0.000); Likelihood function=-209.5
7: N=132; Sigma=0.907 (p=0.000); Likelihood function=-165.7
8: N=132; Sigma=4.147 (p=0.000); Likelihood function=-326.6
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively.
ARTS*
SOC*
MED*
Mature
Post1992
Specialise
ARTS
Regression
4 875 6
LANG*
PHYS*
Regional
STAFFpub
STAFFcom
Disclose
Dependent variable
CONTRACT SME LARGECONSULTLOCAL
INCOME from relationships with FIRMS
Strategy
Constant
Size
Variable
LANG
PHYS
SOC
MED
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Table 9: Relationship between faculty quality and modes of industry involvement  
Income from all organizations Income from firms only   
Coll. 
Res. 
Contr. 
Res. 
Con-
sulting  
Local 
contract 
& consul. 
SMEs 
(contr. 
& cons)
Large 
firms 
(contr. 
& cons) 
Contr. 
Res. 
Con-
sulting 
PHYS good       + +       
PHYS* Top   + +   +     + 
MED good           + + + 
MED* Top -       -       
SOC good + -   - -       
SOC* Top     +       -   
For various types of industry involvement, the table indicates the direction of 
significant coefficients (at 90% level of confidence) of dependent variables indicating 
‘good’ researchers and ‘top’ researchers for different discipline groups.   
 
Table 10: Categorization of disciplines into groups  
 
Arts 
(ARTS) 
Classics, Ancient History, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies  
Archaeology  
History  
History of Art, Architecture and Design  
Library and Information Management  
Philosophy  
Theology, Divinity and Religious Studies  
Art and Design  
Communication, Cultural and Media Studies  
Drama, Dance and Performing Arts  
Music  
Social 
(SOC) 
Built Environment  
Town and Country Planning  
Geography  
Law  
Anthropology  
Economics and Econometrics  
Politics and International Studies  
Social Policy and Administration  
Social Work  
Sociology  
Business and Management Studies  
Accounting and Finance  
Education  
Sports-related Subjects  
 44
Medical & 
biological 
(MED) 
Medical Laboratory Sciences  
Community-based Medical Subjects  
Hospital-based Medical Subjects  
Medical Dentistry  
Pre-Medical Studies  
Anatomy  
Physiology  
Pharmacology  
Pharmacy  
Nursing  
Other Studies and Professions Allied to Medicine  
Psychology  
Biological Sciences  
Agriculture  
Food Science and Technology  
Veterinary Science  
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Table 4 (cont’d): Categorization of disciplines into groups  
 
Physical & 
engineering 
(PHYS) 
Chemistry  
Physics  
Earth Sciences  
Environmental Sciences  
Pure Mathematics  
Applied Mathematics  
Statistics and Operational Research  
Computer Science  
General Engineering  
Chemical Engineering  
Civil Engineering  
Electrical and Electronic Engineering  
Mechanical, Aeronautical and Manufacturing Engineering  
Mineral and Mining Engineering  
Metallurgy and Materials  
Area & 
Languages 
(LANG) 
American Studies  
Middle Eastern and African Studies  
Asian Studies  
European Studies  
Celtic Studies  
English Language and Literature  
French  
German, Dutch and Scandinavian Languages  
Italian  
Russian, Slavonic and East European Languages  
Iberian and Latin American Languages  
Linguistics  
As corresponding to the ‘units of assessment’ used in the UK Research Assessment 
Exercise 2001.  
 
